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THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE AFTER FERGUSON v. CITY OF 
CHARlESTON 
I. INTRODUCTION 
States have the burden of keeping the public safe, while at the same 
time, respecting individuals' privacy rights. The Founding Fathers 
recognized these competing interests and created the Fourth Amend-
ment to the Constitution to impose limits on the state's intrusion into 
. private life. To protect individuals' privacy rights, the Founding Fa-
thers wrote in the Fourth Amendment that "no [w]arrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause."l However, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has recognized exceptions to this general rule requiring 
probable cause to conduct a search.2 Under certain circumstances, 
such as the need to keep drugs out of schools;3 the effective imple-
mentation of a probation system;4 or the need to keep illicit drug 
users from operating dangerous vehicles,5 special needs justifY a de-
parture from the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. 6 
This exception is called the special needs doctrine. 7 
Since New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court has recognized a spe-
cial needs exception to the probable cause requirement imposed by 
the Fourth Amendment.8 Essentially, this exception recognizes that a 
state's "special needs" justifY a search predicated on less than the 
Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement when the objective 
serves "non-law enforcement ends."g To determine whether such a 
search is reasonable, the interests of the government must be bal-
anced against the individual's privacy interests. 1O 
Recently, the Supreme Court discussed the special needs doctrine 
in Ferguson v. City of Charleston. Il In Ferguson, the Medical University of 
South Carolina (MUSC) , a state hospital, tested pregnant women for 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2. See infra Part II. 
3. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). 
4. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987). 
5. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,620 (1989). 
6. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text; see also Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873 
(quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun,j., concurring)). 
7. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, j., concurring). 
8. Id. (Blackmun, J., Concurring). 
9. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 (2001). 
10. Id. at 74 n.7 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 
(1995); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873; O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 
(1987) (plurality opinion); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351. 
11. 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
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cocaine use without their knowledge. I2 Women who tested positive 
for cocaine use were charged with criminal child abuse. 13 The Court 
ruled that MUSe's drug testing program violated the women's Fourth 
Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable search and 
seizure. 14 The majority reasoned that because the hospital worked 
with the police during the testing period, and threatened criminal 
prosecution, the "immediate objective" of the drug testing program 
was to "generate evidence for law enforcement purposes."15 Accord-
ingly, MUSC's drug testing policy did not fit into the category of the 
"special needs" doctrine.16 
Notwithstanding Ferguson, the special needs doctrine has been char-
acterized as inconsistent. I7 Ferguson adds to the confusion because it 
is the first decision to focus on a program's immediate objective, 
rather than its ultimate objective. IS This approach is contrary to prior 
case law and raises questions as to whether the state may use ordinary 
law enforcement techniques when it is pursuing special needs beyond 
the scope of ordinary law enforcement. 
This Comment proposes that courts should look to the ultimate 
purpose, rather than the immediate objective of the program. 19 Fur-
thermore, the courts should not invalidate a special needs program 
simply because it involves an element of law enforcement. Rather, the 
courts should determine whether law enforcement is an incidental, 
rather than integral, part of the special needs program.20 
In Part II, this Comment examines the development of the special 
needs doctrine and the unresolved questions regarding the doctrine's 
scope and use. Part III attempts to answer these questions by first ana-
12. Id. at 70-73. 
13. Under South Carolina law, a viable fetus is considered a person, particu-
larly in cases where the mother ingests cocaine. Id. n.2. In such a case, 
South Carolina's Supreme Court has held that ingesting cocaine during the 
third trimester constitutes criminal child neglect. Id. (citing Whitner v. 
South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1995), cm denied, 523 U.S. 1145 
(1998». If the pregnancy was 27 weeks or less, the patient was to be 
charged with simple possession. Ferg;uson, 532 U.S. at 72. If a woman "deliv-
ered 'while testing positive for illegal drugs,' she was also to be charged 
with unlawful neglect of a child." Id. at 72-73. 
14. See id. at 84. 
15. Id. at 83. 
16. Id. at 84. 
17. See generallyJennifer E. Smiley, Rethinking The "Special Needs" Doctrine: Sus-
picionless Drug Testing of High School Students and the Narrowing of 
Fourth Amendment Protections, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 811, 826-28 (2001) (dis-
cussing several other inconsistencies in the special needs doctrine and how 
it has led to confusion in the lower courts); Sean Anderson, Individual Pri-
vacy Interests and the "Special Needs" Analysis for Involuntary Drug and HIV Tests, 
86 CAL. L. REv. 119, 147-48 (1998) (discussing inconsistency among lower 
courts when applying the special needs doctrine). 
18. See infra Parts II and III.C.3. 
19. See infra Part III.C.3. 
20. See infra Part III.C.4. 
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lyzing the types of state interests that fall under the special needs doc-
trine. Furthermore, Part III examines when and how normal law 
enforcement techniques, such as arrest and prosecution, may be used 
in the implementation of a special needs search policy. Finally, Part 
IV summarizes the proposed answers to the unresolved questions set-
ting forth criteria under which to determine whether a less-than-prob-
able-cause search falls under the special needs doctrine. 
II. BACKGROUND FACTS AND LEGAL DOCTRINE 
A. Balancing the Public Interest Against Privacy Interests 
The Fourth Amendment states "[t]he right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause."21 This does not require, however, that 
all searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable 
cause. As the court wrote in Camara v. Municipal Court, "reasonableness 
is ... the ultimate standard" for determining whether a search is con-
ducted in a manner that violates the Fourth Amendment.22 As the 
Supreme Court stated in Camara, "[u]nfortunately, there can be no 
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the 
need to search against the invasion which the search entails."23 In 
balancing the need to search against the invasion of an individual's 
privacy rights, the Supreme Court has held that a search predicated 
on less than probable cause, or without a warrant, may still be deemed 
constitutional " [when] special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable. "24 
This is the paradigm in which special needs cases are decided. The 
Court must determine whether, given the compelling nature of partic-
ular societal needs, it would be "impracticable" to require authorities 
to adhere to the probable cause-warrant requirement. 25 This is not a 
static test; rather, it requires that the courts determine whether, given 
the competing interests at stake, the public interest is best served by a 
reasonableness standard that falls short of the probable cause-warrant 
requirement.26 The outcome is fact-sensitive, and as illustrated below, 
the Court has reached varied conclusions given the varied interests at 
stake.27 
2l. u.s. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
22. 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (emphasis added); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1,9 (1968). 
23. 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). 
24. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, j., concurring). 
25. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
26. See id. at 34l. 
27. See infra Parts H.B-E. 
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B. New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
In New Jersey v. T.L. 0., a high school freshman was caught smoking 
cigarettes in the girls' lavatory.28 Mter being taken to the principal's 
office, T.L.O. denied smoking cigarettes, and the assistant vice princi-
pal demanded to see her purse. 29 The assistant vice principal found a 
pack of cigarettes and a package of cigarette rolling papers commonly 
used to roll marijuana cigarettes. 30 The assistant vice principal contin-
ued to search the purse and found marijuana, paraphernalia, and evi-
dence that T.L.O. was dealing to other students.31 T.L.O. was 
suspended,32 and the state brought delinquency charges against her 
in Juvenile Court.33 
The Supreme Court held that searching T.L.O.'s purse for mari-
juana did not violate the student's Fourth Amendment right to free-
dom from unreasonable search and seizure, even though the 
principal's search was based only on reasonable suspicion.34 The major-
ity opined that" [w] here a careful balancing of governmental and pri-
vate interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a 
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of 
probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard."35 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun agreed with using the 
balancing test to determine whether a search based on less-than-prob-
able-cause is reasonable.36 However, Justice Blackmun said that the 
balancing test should only be used when a court is confronted with "a 
special law enforcement need for greater flexibility."37 Justice Black-
mun opined that" [0] nly in those exceptional circumstances in which 
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make 
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court 




32. Id. at 329 n.1. 
33. 1~L.O., 469 U.S. at 325. 
34. Id. at 343. 
35. Id. at 341. The Court also gave an extensive list of cases where it adopted a 
standard that is lower than probable cause. Id. This illustrates that the less 
- than - probable - cause requirement is not novel to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. See id; see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 
(1976) (holding warrantless border searches at routine checkpoints are 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment); Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (holding that 
"[a police officer] is entitled to the protection of himself and others in the 
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such 
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault 
him"); Camara, 387 U.S. at 538 (holding a warrantless search as part of a 
municipal housing inspection program reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment) . 
36. See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun,j., concurring). 
37. Id. (quoting Florida v. Roger, 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, j., 
dissenting) ). 
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entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the 
Framers."38 
When analyzing subsequent special needs cases, the Supreme Court 
adopted Justice Blackrnun's balancing approach.39 His concurring 
opinion became the foundation for the special needs doctrine.4o 
C. Subsequent Special Needs Developments 
Two years after New Jersey v. T.L. 0., the Supreme Court used Justice 
Blackrnun's special needs balancing test to decide Griffin v. Wiscon-
sin.41 In Griffin, the defendant, a convicted felon, was placed on pro-
bation after being found guilty of disorderly conduct and other 
related charges.42 While Griffin was on probation, his probation of-
ficer received information from a detective that Griffin may have guns 
in his apartment.43 Under the authority of an administrative regula-
tion,44 the probation officers searched Griffin's apartment and found 
a handgun.45 Griffin was charged and convicted of being a felon in 
possession of a handgun.46 The Court upheld the search predicated 
on "reasonable grounds," rather than the stricter probable cause 
standard.47 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that operating a proba-
tion system, like a school or other state institution, "presents 'special 
needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures 
from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements."48 Mter 
concluding that a probation system is a special need of the state, the 
Court balanced the probationer's diminished expectation of privacy49 
against the state's need to successfully operate a probation system.50 
38. Id. 
39. See, e.g., Ferguson 532 U.S. at 72 n.7. 
40. See id. 
4l. See 483 U.S. at 873-74; see infra text accompanying notes 49-52. 
42. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870. 
43. Id. at 87l. 
44. Id. at 870-71 (citing WIS. ADMIN. CODE §§ 328.16(1), 328.21(4) (1981)). 
These administrative regulations allowed probation officers to search pro-
bationers' homes without a warrant so long as a supervisor approved the 
search, and the search was predicated on "reasonable grounds" for believ-
ing the probationer may be in possession of contraband. Id. 
45. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 87l. 
46. Id. at 872. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 873-74. 
49. The majority focused on the fact that probation falls on the spectrum of 
criminal punishment, and, therefore, probationers have more restricted 
liberty and a more diminished expectation of privacy than the average citi-
zen. Id. at 874. Justice Blackmun, the first justice to articulate the special 
needs doctrine, actually dissented in this opinion because he disagreed that 
probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy in their homes. !d. 
at 884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
50. See id. at 876-77. 
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The Court concluded that it is too impracticable to require a magis-
trate-issued warrant based on probable cause to search a probationer's 
home.51 
Two years after Griffin, the Supreme Court decided Skinner v. Rail-
way Executives' Assn.52 and Union National Treasury Employees v. Von 
Raab.53 In Skinner, the United States Department of Transportation, 
under the authority of the Federal Railroad Act,54 tested all on-duty 
employees, who were involved in an "impact accident," for drug or 
alcohol use. 55 The Court borrowed language from Griffin and con-
cluded that 
The Government's interest in regulating the conduct of rail-
road employees to ensure safety, like its supervision of proba-
tioners or regulated industries, or its operation of a 
government office, school, or prison, "likewise presents 'spe-
cial needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify 
departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause 
requirements. "56 
Additionally, the Court noted that the purpose of the drug testing was 
to prevent railway accidents and casualties, and not to prosecute the 
railwayemployees.57 
In Von Raab, the United States Customs Service implemented a pol-
icy that required all employees applying for a promotion to pass a 
drug test.58 It is important to note that if an employee tested positive 
for drug use, the employee was subject to immediate dismissal from 
the Customs Service; however, the results would not be forwarded to 
any agency for prosecution without the written consent of the em-
ployee.59 The employee's union filed suit alleging, inter alia, that the 
program violated the Fourth Amendment rights of employees seeking 
promotions.60 
The Supreme Court held that the state has a substantial need to 
ensure that employees in sensitive positions, such as customs officers, 
51. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876-77. Justice Scalia analogized requiring warrants 
to search probationers' homes with that of requiring parents to obtain war-
rants to search a minor child's room. See id. Justice Scalia compared the 
probation officer to a parent and wrote: "[a probation officer] is an em-
ployee of the State Department of Health and Social Services who, while 
assuredly charged with protecting the public interest, is also supposed to 
have in mind the welfare of the probationer." Id. at 876. 
52. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
53. 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
54. 45 U.S.c. § 431 (a) (repealed 1994). 
55. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609. 
56. Id. at 620 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873 - 74). 
57. Id. at 620-21 (citing 49 CFR § 219.9 (1987». 
58. See 489 U.S. at 660. 
59. Id. at 663. 
60. Id. 
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are not using illegal drugs.61 The Court also reasoned that because 
employees who tested positive were not subject to prosecution, the 
drug testing program was designed to serve the state's needs beyond 
ordinary law enforcement.62 Therefore, the Court balanced the 
state's special need against the customs officers' privacy rights and 
concluded that the need outweighed the customs officers' privacy in-
terests.63 The Court reasoned that the program utilized several safe-
guards to minimize the intrusion into the employee's privacy 
interests.64 Requiring the Customs Service to obtain search warrants 
based on probable cause would interfere with the its mission.65 The 
Court also generalized that requiring the government to obtain a war-
rant for every work-related intrusion would severely impair its govern-
mental function because every employee matter would become a 
constitutional concern.66 
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Vernonia School District 47] v. 
Acton.67 In Acton, an Oregon school district implemented a policy of 
randomly testing student athletes for drug use.68 The school targeted 
student athletes because of their status as role models for the other 
students, and the faculty believed that student athletes were behind 
the sudden increase in drug use at the high schoo1.69 If a student 
tested positive for drug use more than once, he or she had the option 
of enrolling in a six week program.70 If a student refused to obtain 
treatment, he or she would be suspended from playing on student 
athletic teams.71 
James Acton, a seventh grader in the Vernonia School District, was 
denied a place on the football team because his parents refused to 
sign the test consent form that was required to be eligible for student 
athletics.72 The Actons filed suit asking for declaratory and injunctive 
relief on the grounds that the drug testing policy violated Actons' 
61. Id. at 666. 
62. Id. 
63. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668. 
64. See id. at 672 n.2 (noting that the Custom SeIVice's drug testing program 
only tested for specific drugs, and that employees were not required to dis-
close any medical information unless the employee tested positive for such 
specified drug use). 
65. See id. at 666-67. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, opined that 
"[t]he Customs Service has been entrusted with pressing responsibilities, 
and its mission would be compromised if it were required to seek search 
warrants in connection with routine, yet sensitive, employment decisions." 
Id. at 667. 
66. See id. at 666. 
67. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
68. Id. at 648. 
69. See id. at 648-49. 
70. Id. at 651. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
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Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.73 The Supreme Court 
held the drug testing policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 74 
The Court held that although prior cases such as Skinner and Von 
Raab characterize the state's special need as "compelling," courts 
should not view this as a fixed standard.75 Justice Scalia, writing for 
the majority, held that state interest must be important enough to justify 
the search.76 Whether the school district's sudden increase in student 
drug use constituted a compelling governmental interest was irrele-
vant. The Court held that the interest was important enough to justify 
the random drug testing.77 The Court also balanced the nature of the 
intrusion and the diminished expectation of privacy of students, par-
ticularly when they voluntarily try out for athletics, and concluded that 
the random drug testing was reasonable, and therefore 
constitutional. 78 
The first time the Supreme Court did not uphold a special needs 
search was in Chandler v. Miller. 79 The Court found a Georgia law re-
quiring political candidates to take drug tests to be an unreasonable 
search, and thus, violated the Fourth Amendment.80 A group of liber-
tarian party candidates brought suit on the grounds that the Georgia 
law violated their First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.81 
The Court agreed with the candidates and ruled that, "Georgia's re-
quirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test ... does not 
fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible 
suspicion less searches."82 
The Court, per Justice Ginsburg, held that the state failed to show a 
special substantial need that is important enough to override the indi-
vidual's privacy interest and depart from the Fourth Amendment's 
normal requirement of probable cause and individual suspicion.83 
The majority reasoned that the state did not demonstrate that the stat-
ute was enacted as a result of fear or suspicion that state officials were 
involved in illegal drug use, or any other articulable concrete danger.84 
The statute was merely enacted under the belief that drug use is not 
compatible with holding public office.85 This is the first time the 
73. Acton, 515 U.S. at 651. 
74. [d. at 664-65. 
75. [d. at 661. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. at 664-65. 
79. 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
80. See id. at 323. 
81. [d. at 310. 
82. [d. at 309. 
83. See id. at 320. 
84. See id. at 321-22. 
85. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322. The Court characterized the need to test 
political candidates for drug use as being "symbolic," opposed to "special." 
[d. 
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Court required the state to show an actual, rather than abstract, dan-
ger that required a departure from the traditional probable cause war-
rant standard of the Fourth Amendment.86 
D. Ferguson v. City of Charleston 
The Supreme Court revisited the special needs doctrine in Ferguson 
v. City of Charleston.87 In this case, a public hospital, The Medical Uni-
versity of South Carolina (MUSC), became concerned with an alarm-
ing increase in the number of pregnant patients abusing cocaine.88 
The hospital had previously adopted a policy of testing patients' urine 
who were suspected of using cocaine.89 The hospital was also refer-
ring patients who tested positive to counseling and treatment.90 De-
spite counseling and treatment, however, cocaine use did not 
recede.91 
Unhappy with the results from counseling and treatment, MUSC's 
general counsel made arrangements to refer the pregnant patients 
who tested positive for cocaine use to the City Solicitor for prosecu-
tion.92 The patients were never told that they were being tested for 
cocaine use.93 Initially, the policy was to refer any positive test result 
to the City Solicitor for prosecution, but the policy was later modified 
to forward test results to the City Solicitor for prosecution only if the 
patient failed to comply with drug treatment recommendations.94 
In a divided opinion,95 the Supreme Court held that testing the 
pregnant women for cocaine use without their knowledge,96 and pros-
86. See generally Robert D. Dodson, Ten Years of Randomizing jurisprudence: 
Amending the Special Needs Doctrine, 51 S.C. L. REv. 258, 271 (2000) (giving 
an in-depth history of special needs case law, prior to Ferguson, and discuss-
ing the impact of Chandler). 
87. 532 U.S. at 78-79. 




92. See id. at 70-71. South Carolina law recognizes a viable fetus as a person. Id. 
at 70 n.2. Accordingly, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that in-
gesting cocaine during the third trimester constituted criminal child neg-
lect. Id. 
93. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76. 
94. Id. at 72. 
95. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the majority, which also included Jus-
tices Breyer, Ginsburg, O'Connor, and Souter. Justice Kennedy filed a con-
curring opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice 
Thomas dissented. Id. at 69. 
96. There was some debate about whether the patients consented to the drug 
tests. Justice Scalia argued that the patients consented to the search by 
voluntarily giving their urine specimens to the hospital. Ferguson, 532 U.S. 
at 93-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia reasoned that the patients 
voluntarily entrusted their evidence to the hospital, and the Fourth Amend-
ment does not protect persons who have a mistaken belief that the confi-
dant can be trusted with the evidence. Id. at 94. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
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ecuting them for child neglect, did not fit within the special needs 
doctrine, and violated the women's Fourth Amendment right to free-
dom from unreasonable search and seizure.97 The majority reasoned 
that although the ultimate goal of the program may have been to pro-
tect the health of the fetuses and get pregnant mothers off drugs, the 
immediate objective of the testing was to generate evidence for prosecu-
tion.98 The majority focused on the extensive law enforcement in-
volvement at every stage of the process.99 The majority also 
emphasized that law enforcement always serves a broader goal, and 
any suspicionless search could be upheld under the special needs doc-
trine by analyzing the search in terms of the ultimate social objective 
of law enforcement. lOO 
Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, but disagreed with the ma-
jority's use of the immediate objective approach. lOI Justice Kennedy 
argued that that the distinction the majority makes between the ulti-
mate goal of the program and its immediate objective is inconsistent 
with prior special ne~ds case law.102 For example, using this analysis, 
the majority would have concluded that the goal of the Vernonia 
School District in Acton was to collect evidence of drug use, rather 
than deterring drug use among school children.103 
Despite disagreement with the majority's reasoning, Justice Ken-
nedy believed this case fell outside the scope of the special needs doc-
trine because of the extensive police involvement from the program's 
inception.104 Justice Kennedy reasoned that the hospital became an 
"institutional arm of law enforcement," and the program had a "penal 
character with a far greater connection to law enforcement than other 
searches sustained under [the Court's] special needs rationale."105 
Justice Scalia's dissent, as a preliminary matter, opined that the 
drug testing was a search within the scope of the Fourth Amend-
and Justice Thomas did not concur in this portion of the dissent. The ma-
jority left this question of consent to the lower courts because it was not 
raised in the Court of Appeals of the United States. Id. at 77 n.ll. 
97. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84. 
98. Id. at 82-83. 
99. Id. at 82. 
100. Id. at 84. 
101. See id. at 86 (Kennedy,j., concurring). 
102. Id. at 87. 
103. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 87(Kennedy,j., concurring). Justice Kennedy also 
used the example of the Von Raab cases. Kennedy argued that had the 
Court adopted this approach in deciding the Von Raab and Skinner case, the 
Court would have concluded that the state's goal was to collect evidence of 
drug use, rather than prevent the promotion of drug users to sensitive posi-
tions, or prevent drug users from operating locomotives, respectively. Id. 
(Kennedy, j., concurring). In both cases, the Court looked to the ultimate 
goal of the program. Id. (Kennedy, j., concurring). 
104. See id. (Kennedy,j., concurring). 
105. See id. at 88-89. (Kennedy, j., concurring). 
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ment. 106 Justice Scalia analogized the urine with abandoned property 
and pointed out that the Fourth Amendment does not protect aban-
doned property.107 The other dissenting justices did not concur in 
this portion of the dissent. 
Justice Scalia's dissent argued that the hospital's program had a 
goal of improving the health of the mother and unborn child. lOB In 
fact, the hospital had already been testing women for cocaine use 
before it began turning over the results to prosecutors.109 The dissent 
found it "incredible" that using the test results to compel patients into 
treatment, the ultimate goal of the program, becomes a pretext for 
obtaining evidence for prosecution. lIO Additionally, the dissent ar-
gued that adding law enforcement to a special need does not destroy 
the applicability of the special needs doctrine. I II 
E. Unresolved Questions 
In light of Ferguson and other cases applying the special needs doc-
trine, several of the most important questions are unresolved. First, 
does the involvement of law enforcement techniques, e.g., arrest and 
prosecution, remove an otherwise special need of the state from the 
boundaries of the special needs doctrine? Secondly, should courts 
look to the special needs program's immediate objective, its ultimate 
objective, or both? The proceeding section will show that normal law 
enforcement techniques do not necessarily void an otherwise valid 
special needs program.1I2 Finally, based on the case law as a whole, 




This section first addresses the types of state special needs interests 
that fall under the special needs doctrine. It also attempts to answer 
the unresolved questions raised with the majority opinion in 
Ferguson. I 14 
lO6. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 92 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
107. See id. at 93. Maryland has also adopted this view. See Venner v. State, 30 
Md. App. 599, 626-27, 354 A.2d 483, 498-99 (1978) (holding that a person 
has no property rights in discarded human waste). 
108. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 99 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
109. [d. at 99 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
110. [d. at 99-100 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
111. [d. at 100 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
112. See infra Part I1I.C.2. 
113. See infra Part I1I.C.3. 
114. See supra Part II.E. 
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B. Defining the Special Need 
1. Generally 
The Supreme Court has never given clear guidance to the courts to 
help identify what types of state interests fall under the special needs 
doctrine. The only clear criterion is that the state interest must go 
beyond the scope of ordinary law enforcement interests. I 15 However, 
several cases allow courts to make several other generalizations. 116 
2. The Interest Must Be Important, Not Compelling 
In Acton, 117 Justice Scalia's majority opinion clarified the standard 
previously articulated in Skinner and Von Raab. Skinner and Von Raab 
both held that the respective natures of the governmental interests at 
stake were "compelling."118 Justice Scalia wrote that although previ-
ous special needs cases have characterized the state interest as "com-
pelling," it is a mistake to think of this as a fixed standard. 119 Instead, 
Justice Scalia wrote that the interest must merely be "imponant enough" 
to justify the search at hand. 120 
On its face, this analysis seems to side-step the first stage of special 
needs analysis. Traditionally, the Court has first focused on the com-
pelling state interest that goes beyond normal law enforcement and 
proceeded with balancing the interests of the state versus the intru-
sion on the individual's privacy interests. 121 Acton, however, did not 
involve a program where students were subjected to arrest and prose-
cution.122 Because it was clear that the program was not intended for 
ordinary law enforcement, the only issue was the importance of the 










See, e.g., Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79. This requirement is of little assistance 
given the Court's recent distinction in Ferguson between the intermediate 
objective and ultimate goal. As discussed above, the Court's distinction be-
tween the intermediate purpose and ultimate goal of the special needs pro-
gram makes it difficult to determine when a state's interest goes beyond the 
scope of ordinary law enforcement. See infra Part II.A. 
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313-14; Acton, 515 U.S. at 660-61; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 
873-74; see infra Parts III.B.2-5. 
515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628 (holding that the government's interest in col-
lecting and testing locomotive operators for drug use without individual-
ized suspicion was compelling); see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670 (holding 
that the government had a compelling interest in ensuring that customs 
agents, as one of the front lines of drug interdiction, were not drug users 
themselves). 
Acton, 515 U.S. at 66l. 
Id. Justice Scalia held that simply determining whether deterring drug use 
in public schools is a compelling interest is irrelevant. Id. However, he rea-
soned that deterring drug use in pubic schools is at least as important as the 
state interests in Skinner and Von Raab. Id.; see also supra note 114. 
TL.O., 469 U.S. at 337. 
See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text. 
Acton, 515 U.S. at 653. 
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cial needs analysis requires that the state pursue an important interest 
beyond the scope of law enforcement. 124 The second prong requires 
the court to weigh the important state interest against the individuals' 
interests to determine if the search is reasonable. 125 
3. The Danger Must Be Concrete or Imminent 
Another characteristic of a special need is that the danger must be 
concrete. In Chandler v. Miller, the Court ruled that a law requiring 
political candidates to pass a drug test was not based on any particular 
suspicion that drug abuse was a problem among state office hold-
ers.126 The Court reasoned that absent any actual danger, there was 
no special need to conduct suspicionless drug testing. 127 Given these 
circumstances, the Court ruled that the testing was a symbolic need, 
rather than a special need. 128 
The requirement that the state's special need must be to correct an 
actual, present danger is consistent with prior opinions. 129 The major-
ity in Chandler, however, had to distinguish the present suspicionless 
drug policy from the suspicionless drug testing policy in Von Raab. 130 
The Court devoted a large part of its opinion distinguishing the two 
cases. The Court distinguished Von Raab from Chandler because, al-
though there was no documented evidence of a drug abuse problem 
among customs agents, there was an inevitable danger arising from 
customs agents abusing drugs. 131 Therefore, the state had a compel-
ling interest in preventing or deterring such abuse. 132 In Chandler, the 
state failed to show that political candidates' drug use created a com-
pelling, inevitable danger. 133 Therefore, the Court seems to adopt 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 652-53. 
126. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319. 
127. See id. at 318-19. The Court also focused on the fact that there was no 
surprise as to when the drug testing would take place, rendering the pro-
gram even less effective in promoting a special need, because candidates 
could temporarily stop using illicit drugs in order to pass the drug test. Id. 
at 319-20. 
128. /d. at 322. 
129. See generally Acton, 515 U.S. at 648-49 (noting that there was a significant 
increase in student drug use and rebellion); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 631 (not-
ing that the policy of drug testing after train collisions was adopted in re-
sponse to evidence of alcohol and drug abuse by employees, and the fact 
that collisions are linked to drug impaired employees). 
130. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text. In Von Raab, there was no 
indication that Customs Service employees were abusing drugs, or creating 
any similar danger at the time the program was implemented. Von Raab, 
489 U.S. at 660 (noting that the Customs Service was "largely drug free"). 
131. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 315-16. 
132. Id. The Court reasoned that customs agents were on the front line of drug 
interdiction and needed to carry weapons as part of their duty. Id. at 316. 
Given the nature of their position and mission of the Customs Service, put-
ting a drug user in such a position would pose great danger. [d. 
133. [d. at 318-19. 
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the rule that the state must show an actual, present threat. I34 In the 
absence of a present threat, the state must show that inevitable danger 
would ensue if a potential threat materializes. I35 
4. Situations Where the Court Will Likely Uphold a Search Policy 
Under the Special Needs Doctrine 
It is clear that state interests fall under the special needs doctrine 
when the state is operating public institutions such as schools. T.L. 0. 
and Acton emphasize the state's special need to maintain safe func-
tioning schools. I36 Similarly, the Court recognized that a state has a 
special need to effectively operate a probation system. In Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, the Court stated that "[a] State's operation of a probation 
system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or 
its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs' 
beyond normal law enforcement that may justifY departures from the 
usual warrant and probable-cause requirements."137 Therefore, it can 
be concluded that a state's need falls under the special needs doctrine 
when the search is conducted pursuant to the operation of a public 
institution. 138 
Courts have consistently recognized that the state has a special need 
to operate its sensitive agencies according to their mission, particu-
larly when public safety could be jeopardized. For example, in Von 
Raab, the Court upheld the suspicionless drug testing of U.S. Customs 
agents. I39 In addition. the Court ruled that the U.S. Customs Service 
has been entrusted with pressing responsibilities and "[the Customs 
Service] mission would be compromised if it were required to seek 
search warrants in connection with routine, yet sensitive, employment 
decisions."I4o The Court also noted that requiring every government 
agency to obtain a warrant based on probable cause would impair its 
function because every employment issue would rise to the level of a 
constitutional concern.l4I 
134. [d. at 318-22. 
135. See id. at 320-23. 
136. See generally Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (focusing on the custodial relationship be-
tween school authorities and students and the importance of school offi-
cials creating a nurturing environment); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (noting the 
important interest of the school administrators in maintaining an environ-
ment where learning can take place). 
137. See id. at 873-74. 
138. See generally id. at 875-76. 
139. See generally Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656; see also supra notes 58-66 and accompa-
nying text. 
140. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667. 
141. See id. at 666. 
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5. Summary 
When trying to determine if a state's need is special, it is useful to 
look at: (1) whether the need serves a purpose other than ordinary 
law enforcement; (2) whether the need is important; and (3) whether 
the state's need is in response to an actual threat, or whether immi-
nent danger would ensue if a potential threat materialized. Addition-
ally, the existing body of law shows that the Supreme Court is likely to 
uphold a special needs case when a state is operating a public institu-
tion or agency.142 
C. W'hen and How Much Law Enforcement Can Be Involved in the Imple-
mentation of a Special Needs Program? 
1. The Unresolved Question 
The unresolved question arising from the scope of the special needs 
doctrine is whether employing ordinary law enforcement methods 
such as arrest and prosecution in a special needs search renders it 
unconstitutional. As Ferguson demonstrates, the Court is divided. 143 
Based on the case law as a whole, however, ordinary law enforcement 
techniques such as arrest and prosecution do not necessarily render a 
special needs search unconstitutional. 144 
2. Law Enforcement and Special Needs Searches Before Ferguson Do 
Not Hold that the Presence of Law Enforcement Renders a Spe-
cial Needs Search Unconstitutional. 
The first case to hold that the state could depart from the Fourth 
Amendment probable cause requirement when pursuing a special in-
terest was New Jersey v. T.L.O. 145 In T.L.D., a principal searched ajuve-
nile student's purse [predicated only on reasonable suspicion] and 
found marijuana. 146 When the contraband was found, school officials 
notified the police.147 T.L.O. was suspended from school, and the 
state brought delinquency charges against her in juvenile court.148 
The police involvement and juvenile court proceedings were not an 
issue in the case. Admittedly, juvenile proceedings are not 
142. See, e.g., id. at 656 (upholding a special needs search of U.S. Customs Ser-
vice agents); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 868 (upholding a special needs search in 
the context of the operation of a state's probation system); T.L.D., 469 U.S. 
at 325 (upholding a special needs search in a school setting). 
143. Ferguson, 532 U.S. 67. In Ferguson, the majority included justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter. justice Kennedy filed a concurring 
opinion. Chief justice Rehnquist, and justices Thomas and Scalia dis-
sented.ld. 
144. See infra Part III.C.2. 
145. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
146. See supra Part H.B for a more detailed discussion of the facts. 
147. T.L.D., 469 U.S. at 328. 
148. !d. at 329. 
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prosecutorial in nature, and this may have had some bearing on the 
case. Nonetheless, the state utilized the police and courts in pursuing 
the school's special need to operate safe and effective public schools. 
In Griffin, the Court upheld another special needs search by state 
probation officers of a probationer's home. 149 In Griffin, probation 
officers found a handgun in Griffin's home, and Griffin, a convicted 
felon, was charged and convicted of being a felon in possession of a 
handgun.15o This case is a clear example of the Court upholding a 
special needs case that utilized normal law enforcement techniques. 
Griffin was charged and convicted of a felony and sent to prison as a 
result of a special needs search predicated only on reasonable 
suspicion. 151 
In Griffin, the Court held that the state's actions fell under the spe-
cial need to operate an effective probation system.152 The dissent dis-
agreed with the majority's use of the balancing test as a substitution 
for the warrant requirement. 153 The dissent never argued that the 
presence of law enforcement invalidates an otherwise legitimate spe-
cial needs search. 154 
In Von Raab, the Customs agents' drug test results were not dis-
closed to the police without the agents' written consent. I55 Positive 
test results could, however, lead to termination from the Customs Ser-
vice if the agent could not offer any explanation for testing positive. 156 
The fact that dismissed Customs agents were not prosecuted, facially 
supports the proposition that arrest and prosecution cannot be an ele-
ment of a special needs search program. Unlike T.L.O. and Griffin, 
however, absent any possession or proof of being under the influence 
while performing his or her duties, it is questionable whether there 
would be any crime with which to charge the agent. I57 The other 
cases involve clear instances where the individual is in possession of 
contraband,158 which clearly violates a criminal law. This is a signifi-
cant distinction between Von Raab and other cases such as T.L.O. and 
149. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 868; see also supra Part II.B. 
150. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872. 
151. [d. 
152. See id. at 875-76. 
153. See id. at 881-82. Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, wrote: 
My application of the balancing test leads me to conclude that spe-
ciallaw enforcement needs justify a search by a probation agent of 
the home of a probationer on the basis of a reduced level of suspi-
cion. The acknowledged need for supervision, however, does not 
also justify an exception to the warrant requirement, and I would 
retain this means of protecting a probationer's privacy. 
[d. at 882. 
154. See id. at 881-90. 
155. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663. 
156. [d. 
157. Compare Griffin, 483 U.S. 868 and T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, with Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656. 
158. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871-72; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. 
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Griffin where the individuals in possession of contraband were 
prosecuted. 159 
In Skinner, there was some question as to whether the system set in 
place by the Department of Transportation allowed the test results to 
be turned over to authorities for prosecution. 160 The Court made it 
clear that it thought the drug testing was not a pretext for obtaining 
evidence, but did not decide whether the use of law enforcement 
would "impugn" the administrative nature of the program. 161 
Likewise, in Michigan v. Sitz,162 the Supreme Court held that suspi-
cionless sobriety checkpoints do not violate the Fourth Am end-
ment. 163 Under this program, drivers who were processed at a 
sobriety checkpoint that were suspected to be under the influence of 
alcohol were arrested and prosecuted for driving under the influence 
of alcohol. 164 This is another instance where the Court upheld a sus-
picionless seizure that ultimately led to arrest and prosecution.165 
Similarly, the Court has admitted evidence against a defendant that 
was obtained pursuant to a suspicionless administrative search. 166 In 
New York v. Burger, the Court upheld an administrative search of the 
defendant's junkyard made pursuant to a state statute. 167 During the 
search of the junkyard, police officers found stolen property.l68 Bur-
ger was arrested and charged with possession of stolen property.169 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that "[we do not] 
think that this administrative scheme is unconstitutional simply be-
cause, in the course of enforcing it, an inspecting officer may discover 
evidence of crimes, besides violations of the scheme itself."170 Fur-
thermore, the Court noted in Burger that "[s]o long as a regulatory 
scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact 
159. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656; Griffin, 483 U.S. 868; T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325. 
160. 489 U.S. at 621 n.5. 
161. [d. 
162. 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
163. [d. at 455. The Court articulated a three-factor test to determine whether 
temporary seizures at sobriety checkpoints that are based on less than prob-
able cause are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. [d. The Court 
looked to the following three factors: (1) the state's interest in preventing 
accidents caused by drunk drivers; (2) the effectiveness of sobriety check-
points in achieving that goal; and (3) the level of intrusion on an individ-
ual's privacy caused by the checkpoints. [d. 
164. [d. at 447. 
165. [d. at 45(}'57 (Brennan,]., dissenting). 
166. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 718 (1987) (Brennan,]., dissenting). 
Police searched a junkyard pursuant to a statute that permitted the inspec-
tion of junk yards and automobile dismantlers for proper licensing and doc-
umentation relating to the origin of the dismantled automobiles. [d. at 
693-94. 
167. [d. at 708. 
168. [d. at 695. 
169. [d. at 695-96. 
170. [d. at 716. 
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that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for viola-
tions other than those created by the scheme itself. "171 
Before Ferguson, the Court never held a special needs search, or an 
administrative search, unconstitutional simply because the search 
yielded evidence that later led to criminal charges. 172 The Court con-
sistently upheld such searches, as long as the ultimate goal of the 
search was beyond the normal scope of law enforcement. 173 Ferguson, 
however, takes a different approach.174 
3. Ferguson and the Immediate Objective Approach 
In Ferguson, the Court devoted extensive time discussing whether 
the presence of ordinary law enforcement techniques would, borrow-
ing the Court's words from Skinner, "impugn the administrative nature 
of the ... program."175 The Court was divided with Justices Stevens, 
O'Connor, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg in the majority, Justice Ken-
nedy concurring, and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist dissenting. 
The majority focused on the immediate objective of collecting evi-
dence rather than the ultimate goal of protecting the health of preg-
nant mothers and unborn children.176 The majority reasoned that 
the immediate objective of MUSC's drug testing program was to gather 
evidence of pre-natal cocaine use, even though it was done to serve 
some broader social purpose.1 77 The majority reasoned that all law 
enforcement is meant to serve some ultimate higher social objective, 
and looking to that social objective rather than the immediate objec-
tive would place all searches under the special needs doctrine. 178 
This argument is convincing, but is inconsistent with prior special 
needs case law. As Justice Kennedy argues in his concurring opinion, 
the Court has always looked to the ultimate goal of a special needs 
search policy.179 Justice Kennedy noted that "[t]he circumstance that 
a particular search, like all searches, is designed to collect evidence of 
some sort reveals nothing about the need it serves."180 In other words, 
171. [d. at 717-18. 
172. See supra notes 145-71 and accompanying text. 
173. But see Carmen Vaughn, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment Via the Special 
Needs Doctrine to Prosecute Pregnant Drug Users: Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 
·51 S.C. L. REv. 671, 685-88 (suggesting that the reason that the Court up-
held convictions in Griffin and Sitz was because the defendants were put on 
notice that they may be subject to arrest, whereas in Ferguson, there was no 
notice of the possibility of arrest). 
174. See infra Part III.C. 
175. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5. 
176. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-83. 
177. See id. at 83-85. 
178. See id. at 84. 
179. See id. at 86-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
180. [d. at 87-88 (Kennedy, j., concurring). 
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the state is using the search to serve an underlying interest. 181 
Whether that evidence is used for prosecution, or for administrative 
purposes, is a separate issue not raised by Justice Kennedy in his 
concurrence.182 
Justice Kennedy points out that the majority should have followed 
previous holdings in special needs cases and examined the search pol-
icy's ultimate goal; instead, the majority only analyzed the search's im-
mediate purpose obtaining evidence. 183 For example, in Acton, this 
analysis would erroneously conclude the state's special need to be the 
immediate purpose of obtaining evidence of student-athlete drug 
use. 184 Rather, the court determined the program's ultimate goal to 
be deterrence of student drug use. 185 Similarly, the majority's holding 
in Ferguson would have led the Court in Von Raab to conclude that the 
U.S. Customs Service's special need was to obtain evidence of its 
agents' drug use, rather than the Court's actual interpretation that 
the special need was to avoid the dangers of having drug abusers in 
sensitive government positions. 186 Despite disagreement over the ma-
jority's analysis, Justice Kennedy concurred with the result because 
MUSC's policy had substantial law enforcement involvement from its 
inception. 187 
The dissent pointed out that law enforcement involvement has 
never rendered a special needs search invalid. I88 For support, the dis-
sent relies on Griffin. 189 The majority tries to distinguish Griffin by 
claiming that probationers have a lower expectation of privacy than 
ordinary citizens. 19o As Justice Scalia points out, this is irrelevant to 
the issue of law enforcement involvement and the scope of the special 
needs. 191 Under special needs analysis, the only time the proba-
tioner's diminished expectation of privacy becomes relevant is in the 
second prong of special needs analysis-balancing the interests of the 
state versus the privacy interests of the individuals. However, the sec-
ond prong of the analysis is only reached if the state can first prove it 
has a need that fits within the scope of the special needs doctrine. 
Therefore, the majority's reasoning would dispose of Griffin before 
even balancing the state and individual interests. 
181. See id. 532 at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
182. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
183. See id. at 86-87 (Kennedy, j., concurring). 
184. [d. See generally Acton, 515 U.S. 646. 
185. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 87 (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 661-62). 
186. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666, construed in Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 87 (Kennedy, j., 
concurring) . 
187. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 88 (Kennedy, j., concurring). 
188. See id. at 100 (Scalia, j., dissenting). 
189. [d. at lOO-Ol (Scalia, j., dissenting). 
190. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15. 
191. [d. at 101 (Scalia,j., dissenting). 
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The dissent also looks to mandatory disclosure laws to support the 
use of law enforcement in a special needs search policy. Many states 
have mandatory disclosure laws that compel doctors, psychologists, 
and other professionals to report certain types of information that is 
obtained incidental to treatment. 192 The information obtained by a 
physician often results in arrest. 193 
4. Reconciling the Immediate Objective Approach Articulated in Fer-
guson with Prior Cases 
These competing views can be resolved by Justice Kennedy's con-
curring opinion in Ferguson. 194 Justice Kennedy pointed out that 
courts have always looked to the ultimate goal of a special needs case, 
rather than the search itself.195 
First, prior cases have upheld arrests and prosecutions that arise 
from evidence obtained incidental to special needs searches. 196 Sec-
ond, the immediate objective analysis is inconsistent with prior 
rulings. 197 
Instead, the Court should look to whether the law enforcement in-
volvement is incidental, rather than integral, to the ultimate goal of the 
special needs policy.198 If the law enforcement involvement is merely 
incidental, courts should proceed with balancing the interests of the 
state against the privacy rights of the individual to determine whether 
the special needs search is reasonable. If the law enforcement involve-
ment is an integral part of the special needs search policy, the court 
should find that the state's interest does not fit within the special 
needs doctrine. Accordingly, any search that does not fit within the 
special needs doctrine must satisfy the probable-cause warrant re-
quirement to be found constitutional. 
192. See id. at 100 (Scalia,j., dissenting). 
193. See id. at 80-8l. 
194. See id. at 86-87 (Scalia, j., dissenting). 
195. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 87-88 (Scalia, j., dissenting). 
196. See supra Part III.C.2. 
197. See supra Part III.C.3. 
198. See id. at 101 (Scalia,]., dissenting). Justice Scalia briefly mentions this no-
tion of incidental law enforcement versus integral law enforcement when 
he is paraphrasing what he believes to be the rationale of the majority. See 
id. (Scalia, j., dissenting). 
The majority wrote on this matter the following: 
While state hospital employees, like other citizens, may have a duty 
to provide the police with evidence of criminal conduct that they 
inadvertently acquire in the course of routine treatment, when they 
undertake to obtain such evidence from their patients Jor the specific 
purpose oj incriminating those patients, they have a special obligation 
to make sure that the patients are fully informed about their consti-
tutional rights, as standards of knowing waiver require. 
Id. at 84-85. 
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This approach would discard the Ferguson majority's immediate ob-
jective analysis.199 But this approach is consistent with the majority's 
intent to keep special needs cases beyond the scope of ordinary law 
enforcement.2oo Additionally, this approach is consistent with prior 
cases that look to the ultimate goal of the special needs policy, rather 
than the immediate objective? the search itself.201 
Focusing on incidental, as opposed to integral, law enforcement is 
also consistent with the mandatory disclosure laws the Ferguson dissent 
calls into question.202 Doctors and other professionals do not conduct 
their examinations with the express purpose of obtaining evidence.203 
Nonetheless, there are Laws compelling these professionals to disclose 
such evidence to authorities, even if prosecution ensues.204 Likewise, 
when a state creates a program in which the administrators of a spe-
cial needs search take steps to administratively correct the problem 
that it is seeking to prevent, and law enforcement officials adopt legiti-
mate methods of obtaining the evidence after-the-fact, then the policy 
should be upheld under the special needs doctrine.205 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Deciding whether the state can depart from the Fourth Amend-
ment probable cause-warrant requirement206 is a serious constitu-
tional concern, and it requires a consistent body of law. The Fourth 
Amendment is a cornerstone of our legal system and any relaxation of 
this restraint on government action should be scrutinized. Recogniz-
ing, however, that the Fourth Amendment only protects individuals 
from unreasonable searches, the Supreme Court has upheld departures 
from the probable cause-warrant standard in several situations,207 in-
199. See supra Parts II.D and III.C. 
200. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79. 
201. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text. 
202. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 100 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
203. See id. at 80-81. The Court wrote that" [Physicians or psychologists, in the 
course of ordinary medical procedures aimed at helping the patient her-
self, come across information that uqder rules of law or ethics is subject to 
reporting requirements, which no one has challenged here." Id. 
204. See id. 
205. In his concurring opinion in Ferguson, Justice Kennedy articulated similar 
criteria in the context of the drug tests conducted by MUSC. See Ferguson, 
532 U.S. at 90 (Kennedy,]., concurring). Justice Kennedy reasoned that if 
the medical professionals adopted counseling or other methods of helping 
the patients, and prosecuting authorities adopted legitimate methods of ob-
taining evidence after-the-fact, then this testing scheme would properly fall 
under the special needs doctrine. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
206. See supra Part I. 
207. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (holding that a police officer may temporarily 
detain and conduct a limited search based on articulable suspicion, a stan-
dard that is lower than probable cause). 
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eluding cases where the state is pursuing a special need beyond the 
scope of ordinary law enforcement.208 
The special needs doctrine accommodates these special interests of 
the state.209 Notwithstanding any criticism of the legitimacy of the 
doctrine as a whole,210 a problem arises when courts are left to deter-
mine the scope of state interests that fall under the special needs doc-
trine.211 Recently, in Ferguson, the Supreme Court confused this 
doctrine by looking to the immediate objective of a special needs 
search, holding that the use of ordinary law enforcement placed the 
search policy outside the scope of the special needs doctrine.212 
The Court's holding in Ferguson can be reconciled with prior cases, 
as well as the concurring and dissenting opinions of that case.213 To 
accomplish this, courts must first decide whether the state's need falls 
within the scope of the special needs doctrine. In making this deter-
mination, courts should examine: (1) whether the need serves a pur-
pose other than ordinary law enforcement; (2) whether the need is 
important; and (3) whether the need is in response to an actual 
threat, or imminent danger would ensue if the threat materializes.214 
Additionally, the presence of ordinary law enforcement methods in 
a special needs search should not necessarily render the search un-
constitutional.215 Instead, courts should look to whether the law en-
forcement is an incidental, rather than integral, part of the special 
needs policy.216 Finally, courts should look to the policy's ultimate 
goal, rather than its immediate objective of collecting evidence.217 
This analysis is consistent with the existing body of law prior to Fergu-
son and strikes the proper balance between individuals' privacy rights 
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